Abstract. Risk analysis is the first essential step in the risk management process. In order to do an effective risk analysis, is necessary to identify and quantify the threats to information technology assets. Then statistical models of information security threats are required to develop effective risk analysis methodologies. We present experimental evidence suggesting that network intrusion attacks follows a power law distribution and then we explore some implications for intrusion risk analysis.
Introduction
Risk analysis, also known as risk assessment, is the first essential step in the information security architecture deployment [11] . Information security controls implemented in any organization should be commensurate with its risks. The purpose of information security risk analysis is to determine, on the most objective basis, which security controls are appropriate and cost effective.
There are several approaches to risk analysis. However, these can be classified into two categories: quantitative and qualitative. [10] In the quantitative approach, probability data is not required and only estimated potential loss is used. The main drawback of this approach is its very subjective nature and that it heavily relies on the expertise of the risk analysis team's members. However, it is the most widely used approach to risk analysis.
The quantitative approach focus on two elements: the probability of an event occurring and the likely loss should it happen. Quantitative risk analysis make use of a single indicator called the annual loss expectancy (ALE), calculated for an event as the product of the potential loss by the probability of the event occurrence. Then it is possible to rank events in order of risk and to make decisions about control and countermeasures based on this. The effectiveness of this approach depends on the reliability and accuracy of the statistical data associated with the event.
One of the most important security controls to be considered into an information security architecture are intrusion detection systems, (IDS) [2] [8] . An IDS needs to be cost-effective in the sense that it should cost no more than the expected level of loss from intrusions. Despite this, IDS cost-benefit analysis is seldom done.
In a previous work [6] , major cost factor associated with an IDS were examined, including development cost, operational cost, damage cost due to successful intrusions, and the cost of manual and automated response to intrusions. Cost factors are qualified according to a definite attack taxonomy [7] , which main categories are illegal root access, illegal user access, denial of service, and information gathering. A cost-benefit analysis methodology for network intrusion detection had been proposed [12] , based on an investigation of the cost factors and categories of various intrusions.
But, in order to do a full cost-benefit analysis for NIDS, a loss expectancy value must be obtained, and then a model for potential loss and probability of intrusions is required. In this paper, we present a probabilistic model for network intrusions that follows a power law distribution.
Experimental Data on Attacks
In order to get some insight about what kind of probabilistic distribution follows network intrusion events we analyse data collected by an IDS over several months. The IDS used was Snort 1. Over eight months of observation, 5091 alerts were logged, 137 different kind of attacks were observed, where arachNIDS database includes more than 500 different attack signatures. The most frequent kind of attack logged was port scanning, like SYN FIN Scan (IDS198) or Probe SYN Scan (IDS441), and one of the most rare attacks logged was, for example, a buffer overflow attempt on IMAP service (IDS147) with a single occurrence on the observed period. Virus and worms attacks were not considered because they are not longer supported by Snort.
After ranking attacks by frequency of occurrence, we observed that the most innocuous attacks, those included in the information gathering category, are also the most frequently seen. We observed a high incidence of few probe kind of attack and a very low incidence of more varied and more dangerous attacks, like buffer overflow attempts. In figure 1 we show a plot of rank versus frequency, when can be observed how few attacks are most frequently seen. This observation suggest a power law distribution like that related to many phenomena like Internet traffic [4] , web requests [3] , etc.
When we plot rank against frequency in a log-log scale we obtain what is showed in figure  2 . The least-squares regression line is
where is the alert frequency, and Ö is the alert rank. Then we have . The previous PDF is valid only for ½ Ö ½¿ . This is the well known power law or Zipf-like distribution [1] . For an unknown number of attacks, we can generalize the attack distribution to a zeta distribution 
Implications for Intrusion Risk Analysis
In this section, we explore some implications of the power law distribution of attacks that we already present, for intrusion risk analysis. Let Ð´Öµ be the potential loss caused by the occurrence of the rank Ö attack, then the expected loss for a set Ê of attacks would be
Also we can have a cost ´Öµ for detection and response to an event of rank Ö, that can be calculated by the methodology proposed in [6] and [12] .
For a fixed budget , we want to detect and respond to the attacks that could inflict the greater loss. Then we can formulate intrusion risk analysis as a combinatorial optimization problem in the following way: To find a set of possible threats Ê such that Ä, as defined in (6), is maximized, subject to the constraint Ö¾Ê ´Öµ (7)
In the general case, this problem could be hard to solve, but under some assumptions it could be simplified.
First of all, expected loss (6) can be estimated by its continuous limit We can observe that this integral can be computed as the Mellin transform [9] of the loss function:
A simple closed solution can be found under some assumptions. These assumptions are the following:
1. The potential loss caused by an attack depends only on the kind of attack. That is, the damage inflicted by, for example, a denial of service, is the same doesn't matter what particular DoS attack it is. (For this matter, we can use the attack taxonomy presented in [7] .) 2. Similar kind of attacks are close ranked. That is, all the attacks of the same category (see [7] ) are ranked in some rank interval , and all the events ranked in this interval are of the same kind. 
and then, the expected loss for that particular kind of attack would be
Under assumptions previously stated, attacks can be classified into Ò different kinds, so that for all the attacks of kind , the associated loss to any of them is a constant and all of them rank between an interval where is the most probable attack of kind and the least. Then, we have the expected loss for attack kind as 
Estimated costs for attack prevention, detection and response are much more easier to obtain for whole attack kinds than for particular attacks [7] . Thus, if we define as the cost associated to prevention, detection and response to the attack kind, where ½ Ò , then cost/benefit analysis can be obtained from Ä and values using a methodology like the exposed in [12] .
